ABSTRACT Various advanced 5G techniques are bringing us even closer to the era of smart vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), among which enabling secure communication for any vehicle pair is a necessary prerequisite. However, due to the unique features of fast moving and high dynamics in VANETs, the time for key establishment between a vehicle pair is rather limited. Consequently, traditional shared or public keybased mechanisms, which rely heavily on underlying infrastructure and are usually time-consuming, cannot be adopted for key establishment between vehicles. Toward this end, we propose in this paper an efficient physical layer key extraction method utilizing the received signal strength to generate secret keys, which is able to achieve high bit generation rate and 0-b disagreement, as corroborated by extensive experimental results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have extremely rigorous requirement for the communication delay of safetycritical control information between vehicles in close proximity, e.g., the brake and turn signals. It is noticed that the 5G techniques, which includes various advanced techniques of signal processing, resource allocation, interference management, etc., are bringing us even closer to the era of smart VANETs. Among the 5G techniques, machine-tomachine (M2M) and device-to-device (D2D) communication may also provide an effective technical reference for enabling closely located vehicles to communicate directly instead of relying on the network infrastructure. As motivated by the increasing applications and tremendous market demand, both Google and Apple released their mobile operating systems for automobiles in 2014, and it is estimated that more than 50% of vehicles sold worldwide in 2015 will be connected [1] .
Due to the nature of wireless medium access in VANETs, the vehicles there may be exposed to a number of malicious attacks. For example, in the future VANETs a lot of applications will emerge and users want to share some personal information, e.g., multimedia, with the intended ones, instead of everyone. Therefore, secure communication is necessary, and a common way to secure the message transmissions between two vehicles is to establish a shared key to ensure their confidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we just focus on the key exchange between vehicle to vehicle (V2V) in VANETs.
The conventional key establishment mechanisms are either based on the shared key or public key, which are not suitable for VANETs because of the troublesome key management issues. In VANETs, the nodes frequently join and leave the network and a vehicle has to frequently establish keys with its neighbors. Although the vehicles may be very close to each other, they have to rely on the network infrastructure to establish the keys (as shown in Figure 1 ). If using the traditional key exchange method based on the shared keys, they have to rely on the key management center KMC in the 5G infrastructure, resulting that a huge number of vehicle nodes frequently access to the 5G backbone networks. More seriously, in 5G the number of mobile nodes will increase by 100 times and they may also rely on KMC to establish the shared keys, then the KMC will be overwhelmed. Furthermore, if using the public keys to establish the shared FIGURE 1. Conventional key establishment methods. A and B employ the shared key to exchange a key. They have to contact with their respective KMC in the home networks which also need to exchange some information. C and D use the public keys to establish a key, and they have to access the other side's CA to get the CRL.
key, accessing the certificate revocation list (CRL) in the certificate authority CA is a big issue. For the case when the area is not covered by the infrastructure or the infrastructure is damaged temporarily, the public key infrastructure is not available and they cannot establish a common cryptographic key, which is unacceptable for the VANETs, especially for the autonomous vehicles. What's more, with the development of computing technology, especially the emergence of quantum computer, the attackers computing capability significantly improves which seriously threatens the security base of the this kind of key establishment method, i.e., the computational complexity [2] .
Recently, the physical layer key extraction [3] has attracted intensive research interest, and it provides a promising solution to establish a shared key between two vehicles. The physical layer key extraction method does not need the key management infrastructure. Instead, two vehicles can directly communicate with each other to establish a key, which can avoid the difficulty of key management. What's more, the M2M and D2D communication techniques in 5G can provide technical reference for direct V2V communication, making the physical layer key extraction even feasible. Additionally, it is based on the information theoretic security, and it can improve the security of the existing key systems, e.g., the physical layer key has been used to enhance the existing 802.11i security [4] .
In the physical layer key extraction, utilizing the received signal strength (RSS) is the most common approach to generate secret keys as the RSS readings are readily available in existing wireless equipments. Although many schemes have been proposed for the key extraction based on RSS, unfortunately, existing methods fall short in simultaneously achieving both a high bit generation rate (the number of bit that each RSS can generate) and a low bit disagreement rate (the ratio of the number of different bits to the whole key length). They usually sacrifice the bit generation rate to get a low bit disagreement rate. A low bit generation rate leads to a long key establishment delay, but in VANETs the communication is limited by the period of the encounter duration between two vehicles, especially in the crossroads. It is highly possible that a vehicle has moved out of radio range before two vehicles establishes a shared key. What's more, even a single bit in the keys generated by two sides does not match, the cipher generated by one vehicle cannot be decrypted correctly by the other one, i.e., the generated key cannot be used completely. Therefore, the existing RSS-based key establishment methods are not suitable for the VANETs, and the biggest challenge facing the RSS-based key extraction for VANETs is to get a high bit generation rate with zero bit disagreement.
To solve this problem, we propose an efficient physical layer key extraction method. Instead of increasing the number of quantization interval, we introduce the vector quantization method, to reuse each RSS n times (n is the dimensions of vector quantization) and transform them into 0,1 bit stream. With this method, the key bit generation rate is increased while the key bit disagreement rate remains unchanged. Then a fuzzy extractor is employed to reach a zero bit disagreement rate, which also helps to achieve satisfying randomness. As an initial step, the protocol is implemented in WiFi network cards and extensive experiments are conducted in the indoor environment. We compare our proposal with available schemes in terms of the following three metrics: the bit generation rate, bit disagreement rate and randomness. The result indicates that our scheme outperforms all available schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II the existing key extraction schemes are introduced. Section III presents the details of our scheme HRVQ. In Section IV the experiment results are given. Finally we conclude our paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS A. CONVENTIONAL KEY EXCHANGE METHODS FOR VANETs
Currently, most of the key exchange methods for V2V are based on the public key. Raya and Hubaux [5] pointed out that the simplest and the most efficient method to realize the key agreement is to assign to each vehicle a set of public/private key pairs. Based on non-interactive ID-based public key cryptography, Li et al. [6] proposed a lightweight authenticated key establishment scheme to secure the communications between mobile vehicles. However, nowadays ID-based public key cryptography has not been established. Kim et al. [7] proposed a mutual identification and key exchange scheme based on group signature. In their scheme, there exists only one secret key/group public key pair, and a credential computed using the collision resistant hash function. The credential plays an important role in providing an authenticated ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Wang and Liao [8] proposes a combined public key (CPK)-based privacy enhanced key exchange scheme, through which public key is closely bound to the identity of the vehicle in vehicular mesh network. When the vehicles belong to 5282 VOLUME 5, 2017 different clusters, the scheme provides the mutual authentication between mesh client and mesh router to make network securer.
The above schemes are all based on the public key system. However, in Section 1 we have mentioned that accessing the CRL is a big issue if using the public key to establish the key.
Instead of using the public key system, Chuang and Huang [9] proposed a decentralized lightweight authentication scheme for V2V communication. Their scheme adopts the concept of transitive trust relationships, and just uses the hash chain to produce the session key between the vehicles. However, in their scheme the trust is established based on the a law executor (LE), such as police cars. However, this scheme has two flaws. One is that a LE is not always available, and the other one is that a LE might also suffer from some attacks.
Zhang et al. [10] proposed a novel RSU (Road Side Unit)-aided messages authentication scheme. In their scheme, when an RSU is detected nearby, vehicles start to associate with the RSU. Then, the RSU assigns an unique shared symmetric secret key and a pseudo ID that is shared with other vehicles. However, as we have mentioned in Section 1, a huge number of vehicles will frequently join or leave a VANET, then RSU will be overwhelmed by handling their key establishment. Furthermore, if the area is not covered by a networks, that is, a RSU is not available, then this scheme cannot work.
B. RSS-BASED KEY EXTRACTION
RSS of the radio channel is the most commonly used feature to generate a key, as the RSS readings are readily available in the existing wireless infrastructure. Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [11] extracts bit streams from the RSS readings to generate a key, which sets one threshold and only collects the deep fading. It ensures a high bit generation rate but fails to generating a non-random key. Mathur et al. [12] uses two thresholds and drops the samples with RSS values between the two thresholds. To reduce the bit mismatch rate, this scheme only considers the bit positions which are in the middle of intervals. In such a way, a low bit disagreement rate is achieved, but its bit generation rate is extremely low. Mathuret al. [13] has subsequently proposed to make use of nearby signal sources for generation of keys.
Jana puts forward the adaptive secret key generation (ASBG) scheme [14] , using an adaptive quantization method to divide the RSS into multiple intervals, each of which is represented by a binary code. The scheme has improved the key generation rate to a certain extent and ensured the randomness at the same time, but the bit disagreement rate becomes too high to tolerate.
Patwari puts forward the scheme HRUBE [15] , first introduces TelosB to reduce the time delay on measuring RSS, uses the Karhunen-Loeve Transform(KLT) to improve the key entropy, and uses the multiple interval quantization along with Gray correction function to reduce the bit disagreement rate. However, this scheme introduces additional hardware, and has high computational complexity resulting in the increase of process time. But its key generation rate is still low. To improve the consistency of RSS, Neal Patwari further proposed ARUBE [16] , which introduces the rank step after decorrelation to remove the inconsistency and decreases the bit disagreement rate.
Liu et al. [17] , take the signal fading into consideration on the basis of the multi-interval quantization along with Gray code error correction. They encode the measurements into a bit stream using 0 to denote rising trend and 1 otherwise. The experiment is carried out in a number of scenarios and the results shows that this scheme can get a high bit generation rate, but it lacks of stability and has poor efficiency in the indoor environment where the bit disagreement rate increases exponentially.
The bit extraction schemes above can be roughly divided into the single-bit quantization and the multi-bit quantization. In the single-bit quantization, such as [11] and [12] , each RSS is quantified to one single bit and the number of quantization interval is usually small, which results in a low bit disagreement rate but also reduces the bit generation rate greatly. In the multi-bit quantization, such as [14] and [15] , each RSS corresponds to multiple bits, usually by increasing the number of quantization interval, which improves the bit generation rate, but also introduces a significant bit disagreement rate. Therefore, it can be seen that for the wireless physical layer key extraction the bit generation rate and the bit disagreement rate is contradictory, and existing schemes fail to achieve a high bit generation rate while with a low bit disagreement rate.
III. RSS-BASED HIGH-BIT-RATE, CONSISTENT AND RANDOM KEY EXTRACTION FOR VANETs
Assumption: We assume that the adversary Eve cannot be very close (less than a few multiples of the wavelength of the radio waves being used, for example, if the frequency is 2.4GHz, λ/2 = 6.25cm) to the two protocol parties Alice and Bob while they are extracting their shared key. This assumption is reasonable because in VANETs two vehicles cannot be very close, otherwise an accident will occur. In mathurs work [12] , they have shown by experiments that Eves measurements are very different from the measurements between Alice and Bob when Eve is not very close to either Alice or Bob. Thus, our assumption ensures that Eve measures a different, uncorrelated radio channel from the one between Alice and Bob. It is also assumed that Eve cannot launch a jam attack or cause a man-in-the-middle attack, i.e., our methodology does not authenticate Alice or Bob. Therefore, just like other physical layer key extraction schemes based on RSS, HRVQ also just works against passive adversaries.
In order to solve the contradiction between the bit generation rate and the bit disagreement rate, as well as to ensure the randomness of extracted keys, we propose a wireless physical layer key extraction scheme. Our scheme is divided into three steps: (1) Inconsistency removal, which removes the inconsistent RSS measurements between the two communication parties. (2) Vector quantization, which reuses each VOLUME 5, 2017 RSS n times (n is the dimensions of vector quantization) and efficiently transforms the RSS into 0,1 bit stream. Because of the reuse, the key generation rate is significantly improved, however, the randomness of the generated key gets decreased. (3) Fuzzy extraction, which enhances the randomness, and removes the inconsistency of the generated bit streams as well.
A. INCONSISTENCY REMOVAL
The half-duplex nature of the physical layer means that Alice and Bob are unable to simultaneously measure the channel gain, thus causing the channel information inconsistency between the two communication parties. Additive noise affects each measurement of the two directions in a different way. Due to the non-synchronization in measurements and the presence of noise, the generated secret keys might be different between the two parties. In order to reduce the bit disagreement rate, we introduce the inconsistency removal which removes the inconsistent RSS measurements between the two communication parties.
In order to remove the inconsistent RSS measurements, let's first analyze the characteristics of the RSS which may cause bit quantization errors in details. First, if RSS is divided into two intervals by the mean line, the small shifts of RSS values around the mean line may cause Alice and Bob to divide the two corresponding RSS into different intervals. So, a small difference in RSS measurement around the mean line will result in different quantization results between the two parties. To avoid the error caused by the slight shift, we choose an upper bound q + and a lower bound q − at the both sides of the mean value of the RSS, and remove the RSS values between q + and q − . Secondly, the RSS values may have a sharp jump, resulting that the RSS of Alice is above the q + while the corresponding RSS of Bob jumps below q − . Such a sharp jump generally happens at a single point, and the probability of consecutive jump at multiple points is very small. To reduce the bit disagreement caused by the sharp jump, we introduce the corrective factor m, only considering the bit positions which lie in the middle of continuous m RSS measurements which are all above q + or below q − . Mathur's scheme [12] also introduced this factor, but there is a small difference between our scheme and Mathur's, which will be described in the following part.
In order to accurately process a large number of RSS measurements collected in the information collection stage, firstly we divide the RSS measurements into small blocks and calculate the reference levels for each block separately. Second, we define the label function R(x) to remove small shifts and to reconcile a common RSS array without information revealing. Assuming that the RSS measurement array is X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k }, x i ∈ Z , all the k measurements are divided into t blocks, each of which is of length b, and the function R(x) is shown as follows:
In addition, for the t blocks the reference level arrays are Q+ = {q
in which we define q + i = mean i + α * std_derivation i and in the other way q − i = mean i − α * std_derivation i , where mean i is the mean value of the ith block, α ∈ (0, 1) is the fluctuation factor, and std_derivation is the standard derivation of the ith block. According to the reference level, all the RSS values larger than q + i are labeled as 0, the RSS value smaller than q − i are labeled as 1. And, the RSS measurements between the two reference levels are discarded to remove the impact of small shifts. Then Alice and Bob parse through their channel estimates to find out the locations lying in the middle of continuous m RSS measurements which are all above q + or below q − . The above inconsistency removal algorithm is described as follows:
(1) Alice parses her channel, estimates and generates the 0, 1 sequences according to the label function R(x). Then she checks the bit stream and records the index numbers lying in the middle of continuous m zeros or ones.
Note that the RSS readings should be checked one by one, which means if m = 2 and there exists three continuous RSS readings below q − , we should record two index numbers, the first one and the second one, into the L a_to_b array. All the recorded index numbers are stored in the array L a_to_b = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l a }. Then Alice sends this array to Bob.
(2) Bob also generates the bit stream according to R(x), and records the index numbers in the middle of continuous m zeros or ones. For each index in the L a_to_b , Bob checks whether he has recorded the same index number and constructs a list L b_to_a for all the index numbers recorded by both Alice and Bob. Then L b_to_a is sent to Alice.
(3) All the RSS measurements with the index in L b_to_a are saved by Alice and Bob as the effective input of the next step vector quantization.
B. N-DIMENSION VECTOR QUANTIZATION
There is always a contradiction between the bit disagreement rate and the bit generation rate in existing physical layer key extraction schemes. Most schemes choose to increase the quantization intervals to improve the bit generation rate, which will certainly result in a substantial increase in the bit disagreement rate. To solve the contradiction between the bit generation rate and the bit disagreement rate, we propose an efficient bit extraction method based on vector quantization, which makes full use of the channel information, effectively improves the bit generation rate without increasing the quantization intervals. At the same time, the bit disagreement rate will not increase.
Assuming that the input of N -dimension vector quantization is the RSS array Y = {y 1 , y 2 , .., y d }, y i ∈ Z, which has been processed by inconsistency removal. Each y i ∈ Y corresponds to an index number in L b_to_a , and the corresponding value array generated by the label function R(x) is R(x) = {R(y 1 ), R(y 2 ), . . . , R(y d )}, R(y i ) ∈ (0, 1). For the N -dimension vector quantization, we establish the N dimension vector as:
where the array = { 1 , 2 , . . . , N −1 } means the intervals between the components, in which j is the index interval between the jth component and the (j+1)th component. Then for each input y i , the output of the N -dimension vector quantization is:
The N -dimension vector quantizer transforms the discontinuous RSS values into bit streams. Using y i as an input, the quantizer searches for the second component to the N th component based on the array, forming the N dimension vector, and lines up the N values generated by the label function R(x) to form a bit stream of length N , according to the index number of the N components. The quantization process is described in Algorithm 1 in details. for j=1 to N-1 do 6: N -dimension vector quantization can be considered as the establishment of N -dimension coordinate system, which partitions the space into 2 N space and each of them can be represented by 2 N unrepeatable Gray codes of length N . The N dimension vector can be mapped to the 2 N space, that is, it can be replaced by the corresponding Gray code of length N . As is shown in Figure 2 , the two-dimension vector quantization is taken as an example to illustrate the process of vector quantization. Using y i as an input, the quantizer searches for the second component y (i+ 1 ) mod d based on 1 , and computes the value R(y i ) and R y (i+ 1 )mod d , so R(y i )R y (i+ 1 )mod d is the output of the two-dimension vector quantization. The two-dimension vector quantizer is shown in equation (4) .
Algorithm 1 Vector Quantization
As shown in Figure 2 , the RSS measurements between the reference levels Q+ and Q− are discarded (it should be noticed that Q+ and Q− are respectively the reference level arrays of q + i and q − i for every block). We choose two RSS measurements < x 1 , x 2 > as the two-dimension vector and the interval between the two components is . Here, the first component x 1 is above q + and the second component x 2 is below q − , therefore, through the quantizer x 1 will be quantized into 01 which will fall into the fourth quadrant.
C. RANDOMNESS ENHANCEMENT AND ERROR CORRECTION USING FUZZY EXTRACTOR
In the process of vector quantization, the reuse of the RSS measurements introduces correlation between the generated bits, so their randomness is poor and they can be guessed by the attacker. Generally, a hash function or encryption algorithm is used to improve the randomness of the generated bit stream. But a certain degree of bit disagreement rate still exists in the bit stream generated between the two parties after the vector quantization. And the confusion and diffusion introduced by the hash function and encryption algorithm will further increase this rate. Therefore, the challenge that we face now is to enhance the randomness as well as to reduce the bit disagreement rate at the same time. To achieve this, the fuzzy extractor is introduced after the vector quantization to enhance the randomness of the bit stream and to remove the inconsistent bits extracted by the two communication parties
The fuzzy extractor is a random process [18] , which can not only extract as many random bits as possible from the low entropy data, but also outputs a same random value when two inputs are very similar. It is first proposed by Dodis et al. [19] and is further described in [20] . The structure of the standard fuzzy extractor is shown in Figure 3 . 
Definition 1:
The fuzzy extractor consists of the following two processes with the parameter (M , l, t) , where M is the input string.
1) For the input w 0 ∈ M , Gen is a probability generation process, which outputs the public information P and random secret key R of length l, that is, (R, P) ← Gen(w 0 ).
2) Rep is a recovery process, which output the random secret key R with the public information P and the input w , which is similar to w 0 . For all the w 0 , w , ∈ M , if d(w 0 , w , ) ≤ t, there is R ← Rep(w , , P) under the precondition (R, P) ← Gen(w 0 ). where d(w 0 , w , ) ≤ t represents the distance between w 0 and w , should not be larger than t.
There are different ways to implement fuzzy extractors. If w 0 and w , are binary bit streams and their closeness is evaluated by the Hamming distance, then the fuzzy extractor can be implemented through error correction codes.
In our scheme, similar bit streams have been achieved by Alice and Bob after the inconsistency removal and vector quantization, which are denoted by w 0 and w , . With w 0 imported as an input into Gen, Alice employs the fuzzy extractor to generate the correction information P and the secret key R with strong randomness, and then sends P to Bob. With the help of P, Bob recovers w 0 from w , and generates the same random key R as the shared secret key. The BCH code [20] , a CRC code, is selected in our scheme because of its ability to correct multiple errors. And the SHA-1 function is employed in fuzzy extractor to enhance the randomness of the generated bit streams.
D. DISCUSSIONS
Different methods has been tried to improve the scheme during the process of scheme design and experiment.
In the inconsistency removal, the rank method proposed in ARUBE [21] is adopted to eliminate insistent RSS measurements between the communication peers. However, the result indicates that this method reorders all the RSS measurements and suits for multi-interval quantization approaches more. As for the 2-interval quantization, Alice and Bob only need to divide the RSS measurements around the mean line into consistent intervals, and dividing the RSS measurements into blocks has a lower bit disagreement rate and suits our scheme better.
Besides, in order to enhance randomness, several methods were tried which are given as follows. 1) DES: First 56 bits of the bit stream generated by the vector quantization are used as the DES key to encrypt the rest bits in the stream and the cipher text is output as the final shared key. The block cipher characteristic of DES makes the avalanche effect only exist within a 64 bits block, and inconsistent bits in one 64 bits block will not affect other blocks, so the avalanche effect is relatively weak and the resulting bit disagreement rate is quite low. But, the disadvantage of this method is that if inconsistency occurs in the first 56 bits, the final generated bit streams between Alice and Bob tend to differ from each other significantly.
(2) 3DES: The encryption process is similar with that of DES. After confusion for three times, disagreement rate of 3DES is slightly higher than DES, but it has the same disadvantage of DES.
(3) S_DES: The block size of S_DES is very short, only 8 bits per block. S_DES has the weakest avalanche effect and the disagreement rate of key generated by S_DES is the lowest. However, the key generated by S_DES is weak in randomness and cannot pass the NIST test.
4) The randomness extraction scheme proposed by Elias [22] : It has the strongest randomness and the entropy reaches higher than 0.95. Nevertheless, this scheme may cause an extremely high disagreement rate because inconsistent bit stream between two peers will result in different length keys. Therefore, it works well only when the bit disagreement rate is completely eliminated. In addition, this scheme discards a lot of bits resulting in a low generation rate of key.
We compare the above methods with the fuzzy extractor, and the result is shown in Table 1 .
After comparison, we finally select the fuzzy extractor, which can enhance the randomness and eliminate disagreement rate at the same time. In such a way, a consistent and random key can be obtained between the two communication peers.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to verify the effectiveness of our scheme HRVQ, we carried out extensive experiments in the indoor environment. Equipped with TL-WN650G chipsets, the three parties Alice, Bob and Eve all operate in Ubuntu system and use the MadWifi driver. All experiments make use of 802.11g which operates in the 2.4GHz frequency. The MadWifi driver is modified to add reply to beacon frame, called beacon_ack, which carries the same sequence number as the beacon frame. The two communication parties are able to match the beacon and beacon_ack by the sequence number. The length of beacon_ack is 49 bytes. The experiment is conducted in a laboratory which is about 70m 2 . In the experiment Bob moves back and forth nearby Alice and the time interval of two consecutive beacons is 100ms which is the normal rate for the 802.11 wireless network card, in such a way, the endpoints exchange beacon frames at a rate of approximately 10 frames per second, and the RSS values are measured on a per-frame basis. On receiving a packet from Alice, Bob measures and records the RSS value. And immediately, he replies with a beacon_ack packet and then Alice measures and records the RSS value. The adversary Eve eavesdrops all the frames transmitted by the legitimate communication parties, measures and records the RSS measurement of each packet in the same way. Additionally, Eve can move back and forth in the room or move the objects around, but she has to be apart from Alice and Bob more than 10cm and cannot send any jamming signals. At last, we collected a total of 120,000 RSS measurements in the experiments. The performance of HRVQ is analyzed in details as follows. 
A. VALIDATION
To evaluate the performance of our framework, we use the following metrics: (1) bit generation rate, (2) bit disagreement rate and (3) randomness. The schemes we choose to compare with is the scheme of Mathur et al. [12] , ASBG [14] , HRUBE [15] , ARUBE [16] and the scheme of Liu et al. [17] . Figure 4 shows that scheme proposed by Mathur generates random key and has a zero bit disagreement rate, but its bit generation rate is only 15%. In other words, the scheme generates merely 0.15 bits per RSS measurement.
The single-bit extraction of ASBG has a similar performance with Mathurs scheme, while its Multi-bit extraction scheme, expressed as ASBG_m, improves in the performance. But ASBG_m has a substantial increase in the bit disagreement rate. When the bit generation rate reaches 40% the bit disagreement rate will increase to 8%.
The schemes HRUBE and ARUBE have a significant improvement in performance, and when their bit generation rate reaches up to 40%, their bit disagreement rate are just 1.6% and 1% respectively. However, additional hardware TelosB is introduced in HRUBE and ARUBE, and both of them have very high time complexity in singular value decomposition during KLT transformation, reaching up to O(n 3 ).
Liu's scheme achieves a very high bit generation rate, approximate 200%, and this scheme is based on the his statement that 75% RSS measurements are in the upward or downward trend, but the 120000 RSS measurement that we got in the indoor experiment do not show this characteristic. Additionally, Liu's experiment results show that in the indoor environment its bit disagreement rate can reach up to 5%. Nowadays, the most common used keys are at least 128 bits in length (e.g., the key length of AES is at least 128bits), then more than 6 insistent bits will exist in the generated key between two peers if this method is adopted, which is not acceptable in practical applications.
What's more, in randomness aspect, HRUBE and ARUBE just pass the entropy test in the NIST suite, while our scheme HRVQ, as well as the other schemes, pass the 8 items test in the NIST. Therefore, the randomness level of our scheme is higher than the HRUBE and ARUBE. From the comparison, it can be seen that though Mathur and ASBG can reach zero bit disagreement rate which is same as that of HRVQ, the bit generation rate of our scheme is about 16 times of them, reaching up to 284%. Though Liu's scheme can reach a relatively close bit generation rate to our scheme, its high bit disagreement rate completely ruins this effort. In addition, HRUBE and ARUBE introduce the extra hardware which affects their universality, what's more, their randomness test is not enough. Therefore, taking into the three metrics as a whole, our scheme outperforms other schemes saliently.
In addition, let's consider a practical scenario where two vehicles want to agree a shared key of 128bits for AES. Using our scheme with N = 7, it will take about 1.2s to generate a shared key with zero bit disagreement rate, if the beacon interval is set to 25ms, which is practical in real applications. The conversation between vehicles starts and ends very fast, the time left for key extraction is very little. The HRVQ scheme takes only 1.2s for generating a 128bits key, which is fast enough for the VANET applications. In other ad hoc networks, where the communication conversation last longer than in VANET, the HRVQ scheme can be generally applied.
B. ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCY REMOVAL
The label function is defined in the inconsistency removal step which removes the RSS measurements between Alice and Bob that will lead to insistent bits, and three parameters, the block length b, the fluctuation factor α and the corrective factor m are introduced in this process. In the following, we analyze their respective influence on the final bit disagreement rate.
First, to reduce the impact of the different channel fading between Alice and Bob, the RSS measurements are divided into blocks and the reference levels q + and q − are computed separately for each block, which improves the similarity of the RSS measurements between the two parties. Our experiment result, shown in Figure 5 , indicates that the bit disagreement rate gradually falls and becomes very small when the block size b reaches 20, and stays small in a short interval, but increases rapidly when b exceeds 100. Therefore, we pick b = 80 where the bit disagreement rate is lowest.
Second, the fluctuation factor α has an important influence on the bit disagreement rate. The number of RSS measurements between the reference level q + and q − becomes large as α increases, which means that more RSS measurements will be discarded, resulting in the decrease in both the bit disagreement rate and the bit generation rate. On the contrary, when α gets smaller, the bit disagreement rate and the bit generation rate will increase. The impacts of α on the bit disagreement rate and bit generation rate are shown in Figure 6 . Comprehensively considering the impact of α on the bit disagreement rate and the bit generation rate, we set α as 0.2.
Finally, the corrective factor m has a major impact on both the bit disagreement rate and the bit generation rate. The results in Figure 7(a) shows that a larger m will result in a lower bit disagreement rate, as a larger m makes it less likely that Alice's continuous m estimates all lie in the opposite interval that Bob's corresponding m estimates fall in.
Note that if either user's estimates do not have continuous m measurements above q + or below q − at a given index, that index will be discarded and a bit disagreement is avoided. But the increase of m will lead to a sharp decrease in the bit generation rate, especially when m ≥ 2, as is shown in Figure 7 (b). Therefore, in the final scheme, m is set as 2.
C. EFFECT OF VECTOR QUANTIZATION DIMENSION N AND RSS INTERVAL ARRAY
The input of one RSS measurements will produce an output of N bits in N -dimension vector quantization, so a larger value of N will result in the increase of the bit generation rate. However, the reuse of RSS measurements grows as N increases, which introduces bit correlation into the bit stream and thus weaken the randomness. Therefore vector quantization results in high bit generation rate and low bit error rate, but the bit stream generated in this step cannot be used as the encryption key because of the heterogeneity and the dependence on each other.
As shown in [12] , the key extracted may be predictable because they have continuous 0 or 1 bits. Thus, the randomness from the channel has to be improved to meet the requirements of key extraction. We use the vector quantization method to fully reuse each RSS many times to increase the bit generate. On the other hand, we introduce the fuzzy extractor to guarantee the randomness and pass the NIST entropy test. Our goal is to get a high bit generation rate with zero bit disagreement. The randomness of RSS measurements does not contribute to the bit generation. We employ the vector quantization and fuzzy extractor to achieve the high bit generation rate and randomness at the same time.
In order to guarantee to generate a practical key, we introduce the fuzzy extractor, which not only guarantees the zero error rate, but also make the bits independent from each other. But the value of N does affect the radomness of the generated key, so there is an upper bound of N making the secret key extracted by fuzzy extractor can pass the randomness testing. Therefore, the NIST randomness test is employed to test all the secret bits generated in order to guarantee the randomness of the shared key. Like existing schemes, 9 items of NIST are used and the test results for various N are shown in Table 2 . In each item, a p-value bigger than 0.01 indicates the sequence passes this item test. From Table 2 , it can be seen that when N ≤7 the generated bit stream can pass all the items. But when N = 8, the FFT value of the bit stream is 0, which cannot pass the FFT test. Furthermore, when N > 8, the FFT values of the bit stream stay 0. From which, we concluded that in our scheme 7 dimensions are the upper bound for a guaranteed randomness.
The interval array = { 1 , 2 . . . N −1 } also affects the result of randomness test. The value of i should be larger than the channel coherence time to ensure the variation is unpredictable and contains reasonable entropy, because within the channel coherence time, the channel is considered stable or predictable. So we pick 1 = 2 = . . . N −1 = 60 to make sure the time intervals larger than the coherence time and to guarantee a uniform distribution of the vectors in N -dimension coordinate space. Besides, the interval array doesn't affect the bit generation rate and the bit disagreement rate.
D. CONSISTENCY
The fuzzy extractor employed by our scheme can be described as following. With the input of the bit stream w 0 generated by Alice through vector quantization, the Gen process generates the correction sequence P and the random key R using the BCH(23,12) and SHA-1 respectively. Then the correction sequence P is transmitted to Bob and used to recover w 0 from w generated by Bob in vector quantizaion. After that, w 0 is hashed by Bob to generate the shared key using SHA-1. The BCH(23,12) selected in this process represents that with the original code length of 12 and the error correction code length of 23-12 = 11, it has a minimum code distance of 7 and can corrects 3 errors. In this way, the BCH(23,12) codes can correct a bit stream with the error rate no more than 3/12 = 25%. The reason to choose BCH(23,12) is that it is an important class of CRC code and is most commonly used. But in fact, we can choose other type of error correction codes with weaker correction capacity.
Because BCH is a class of CRC code, its computational amount is very small, therefore, the time and energy cost for the code computation is tiny. For the less equipped devices, it is acceptable. In addition, the energy and time consumption to send these BCH error correction codes is also very small. Assuming that we want to generate a key of 512 bits, the length of the bit stream generated by vector quantization should be 512 bits, and it should be divided into 43 groups and the corresponding error correction code is 473 which bits can be transmitted within one packet. In fact, the correction code does not need a special packet to transmit, and it can be carried with the data when data exchange begins between the communication parties.
E. RANDOMNESS Figure 8 shows the variation of the bit generation rate with the dimension N , and the parameters are set as b = 80, α = 0.2, m = 2, 1 = . . . = N −1 = 60. From this figure, it can be seen that:
(1) For a given array of RSS measurements, the bit generation rate increases linearly with the dimension of N when the parameters b, α and m are fixed. This is because each effective RSS measurement input to the vector quantization corresponds to N bits output, which can be found in Algorithm 1. What's more, the last phase fuzzy extractor will not cause bit loss.
(2) HRVQ scheme achieves up to 284% bit generation rate with the 7-dimension quantization. In other words, the HRVQ scheme can extract 2.84 bit key from each RSS measurement on average with the above parameters.
In addition, from the experiment we find that: (1) The bit disagreement rate after the vector quantization stays constant with the increase of dimension N . The number of different RSS measurements between Alice and Bob is fixed after the inconsistency removal, this is because in this step every RSS is reused N times no matter whether it will introduce inconsistent bits or not. So the bit disagreement rate, the ratio of different bits number to bit stream length, stays constant with the increase of N . (2) The bit disagreement rate is merely 0.116% between Alice and Bob after the vector quantization, far lower than the error correction capability of BCH(23,12), the fuzzy extractor can successfully make error correction and generate the same shared secret key. That is, HRVQ scheme can achieve 0 bit disagreement rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we try to establish a shared key between two vehicles through the physical layer key extraction. But, the existing wireless physical layer key extraction methods have significant problems in achieving a high bit generation rate and a low bit disagreement rate. To deal with this issue, we propose a new scheme, employing the RSS of Wifi wireless signal. First, inconsistent channel eigenvalues between the two communicating parties are reduced by the inconsistency removal. Then, the channel information is transformed into bit streams through vector quantization, wherein one RSS is quantized into multiple bits. Finally, the randomness of the bit stream is enhanced and the bit disagreements are eliminated by fuzzy extractor. Extensive experiments are conducted in the indoor environment and the result indicates that our scheme outperforms all other schemes, reaching 284% bit generation rate which is about 6 times higher than the known best solution when the bit disagreement rate is controlled within 1%, and meanwhile a zero bit disagreement rate is achieved with a guaranteed randomness.
